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  • Mar 11, 2024
  • 2 minutes

(Afrik.com)
Les immigrés de l’Afrique subsaharienne ne sont plus les bienvenus au Maroc. Ces derniers temps, le Royaume chérifien, qui souhaite réguler les flux migratoires, a durci sa politique de répression des immigrés clandestins. Le député socialiste Abdelhadi Khayrate a même affirmé qu’ils représentaient un « danger » pour le Maroc.
Les immigrés y penseront à deux fois avant de se rendre au Royaume chérifien. Ces derniers temps, le Maroc a durci le ton contre les migrants en situation irrégulière qui résident sur son territoire, les contrôles sont beaucoup plus stricts aux frontières. L’objectif, limiter à tout prix les flux migratoires.
La police justifie sa politique de répression envers les immigrés, en les accusant d’être des « criminels de guerre ». Le député socialiste Abdelhadi Khayrate est même allé plus loin. En mai dernier, lors d’une séance à l’Assemblée nationale, il a été jusqu’à affirmer que les immigrés sont armés et entrainés et qu’ils représentent un danger pour le peuple marocain. De même, début juin, le journal indépendant marocain Assabah avait également créé la polémique avec un article intitulé Les immigrés africains impliqués dans des crimes de guerre. Le quotidien avait publié une enquête du gouvernement sur les immigrés résidant au Maroc et recherchés pour crimes de guerre à l’international.
« Ils subissent des traitements inhumains »
Les immigrés sénégalais, eux, affirment avoir été victimes de brimades dernièrement, selon le journal sénégalais Le Quotidien. Certains sont torturés dans les commissariats de police, d’autres rejetés à la frontière. Une traque qui se fait jusqu’à leur domicile, raconte l’un d’entre eux au journal. « Actuellement tous les Sénégalais sont menacés d’expulsion », assure-t-il. Dakar et Rabat sont pourtant des pays-amis. Cette situation pourrait bien ternir leurs relations.
Selon une enquête menée par le Conseil de la communauté marocaine de l’étranger (CCME), le nombre d’immigrés africains n’excéderait pas 10 000. Ils sont originaires du Cameroun, de Guinée, du Sénégal ou du Nigeria. Pour certains, le Royaume chérifien est un passage obligé pour se rendre en Europe. D’autres y viennent pour se réfugier ou trouver du travail.
La majorité des migrants rejoignent le Maroc via la frontière avec l’Algérie. C’est d’ailleurs à cette frontière que la police n’hésite pas à les refouler. Plusieurs immigrés de l’Afrique subsaharienne ont été reconduits à la frontière de façon brutale, dénonce l’Association marocaine des droits humains. Selon l’organisation, « ils subissent des traitements inhumains, avec des coups et des insultes à connotations racistes et discriminatoires ».

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David Ottaway Seven months after an Islamist became prime minister for the first time in Morocco’s history, it remains as nebulous here as in Tunisia and Egypt what the Islamists coming to power really portends. It is a conundrum that Islamist-wary Western capitals and independent analysts are all struggling to fathom. In Morocco, King Mohammed VI has yet to yield any real authority under a new constitution, which requires him to pick the prime minister from the winning party of parliamentary elections won last November by the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD). Its leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, now heads the government but is doing everything to avoid confrontation with the king. As a result, nothing of real substance has changed so far nor is it expected to anytime soon. “In Morocco, everything appears to change so that nothing really changes,” commented a prominent Moroccan news analyst, who asked to remain anonymous because of his current falling out with the king. In his view, Benkirane has served to “stop the Arab Spring in Morocco” and his party has played the role of the king’s “shock absorber” from pressures for real political reform. A common prediction is that Benkirane (an Islamist) will prove no more successful in turning Morocco to the right than was Abderrahmane Youssoufi (a socialist) in shifting it to the left after being called back from political exile in France by the late King Hassan to become prime minister in 1998. If Benkirane’s PJD does fail, the likely outcome is the rise of more militant Islamists already mobilizing in anticipation. King Mohammed VI has proven the most agile of the Arab world’s eight monarchs in responding to reform pressures generated by the popular uprisings of last year that toppled the three long-ruling autocratic leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. He stopped a widening protest movement in its tracks by rushing through a new constitution in four months, which was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum last July. He committed himself to appointing the prime minister from the winning party in national elections, widening parliament’s powers, and creating an independent judiciary. But the king still remains “supreme arbiter” in all spheres; he is head of the armed forces and the highest religious authority in the land bearing the title “Commander of the Faithful.” Whether he is a true reformer or just a master manipulator is yet to be seen. The new constitution requires, in theory, a lot of power-sharing between the king and prime minister; how this will work out, in practice, is the question of the day. Right now, there is a sense of calculated gamesmanship by both sides as they discuss new government appointments, Islamic measures for the media, and reform of the judiciary. Many of the constitution’s provisions still require “organic laws” that both the prime minister and the king must approve to take effect. “We are developing cooperation with the king step by step,” said Benkirane’s Minister of Communication Mustapha El Khalfi. “People think democracy will come as a result of conflict between the monarchy and the government. They are completely wrong. Democracy will be the result of cooperation between the two.” The PJD has a tenuous foothold in power. It holds only 107 out of 395 seats in the lower elected house of parliament and 11 out of 31 cabinet posts. The upper house, indirectly elected by municipal notables, is still dominated by the king’s supporters; new local elections will not be held until 2013. The PJD is also constrained by leading a coalition government that includes both ex-communists and pro-royalists. Still, unlike previous prime ministers, Benkirane has quickly proven a popular, telegenic figure. He makes monthly televised appearances before parliament, not only to answer questions but to defend and build support for his government, even its unpopular decisions. As a result, a recent 20 percent increase for a liter of gasoline provoked no street protests. Nor has a bill to assure amnesty to military personnel for abuses committed while on duty. El Khalfi pointed to some early PJD accomplishments in forging cooperation with the king starting with agreement on the appointment of senior government officials. The monarch would continue to name his choices for 40-odd “strategic positions,” but the PJD now has the right to fill 1,140 others. Together, they had also launched a new national health services program, benefiting 8.5 million poor Moroccans and financed by a one percent surtax on private companies’ earnings. There had also been agreement on cuts in operating budgets for all ministries that would help reduce the government’s deficit from 8.5 to 6 percent of GDP. The minister made no mention, however, of one embarrassing faux pas—his own attempt to change guidelines for state TV channels requiring notification of prayer time and more programs in Arabic at the expense of French and Spanish programs. When the king heard of the proposed changes, he reproached El Khalfi by appointing a new commission headed by a leftist minister unlikely to approve such changes. Meanwhile, more militant Islamist groups that have refused so far to participate in parliamentary elections are waiting to see this unprecedented experiment in royal-Islamist “cohabitation” fail. They are deemed by Moroccan and outside analysts a far more serious threat to the king than the youth-led, secular, pro-democracy February 20 Movement, whose widening street protests in early 2011 provoked the new constitution. Already, the Al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality) movement that rejects the king as Commander of the Faithful and hints at a “republic” to replace the monarchy is preparing for its entry into politics. Led by the reclusive, 83-year-old Sheikh Abdul Salam Yassin, the group mixes elements of Sufi mysticism, Salafi fundamentalism, and Muslim Brotherhood-style social activism. It is widely believed to have considerably more followers than Benkirane’s PJD but has eschewed any participation in the monarchy. This may be about to change.  “We are ready. It’s just a question of conditions,” said Omar Iharchane, head of the movement’s research center. Though al-Adl wal-Ihsan is officially outlawed, it was already a registered “political association,” according to Iharchane. It had internal structures in place ready to launch a political party and had demonstrated its political bent by quickly becoming the mainstay of the February 20 Movement. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan’s political clout was made clear last December when it withdrew from the pro-democracy movement and its momentum fizzled. Iharchane predicted Morocco was headed for a second uprising because of its “dire social and economic problems,” adding “we also see problems in the implementation of the new constitution in reality.” He implied that another outbreak of mass protests and PJD’s failure were the “conditions” al-Adl wal-Ihsan was awaiting to make its bid for power. Even more stridently ultra-fundamentalist Islamists, former “Salafi jihadists,” have begun reappearing in public wearing their singular long beards and short white robes. Another of King Mohammed’s gestures to the Arab Spring was the release from prison in April 2011 of three of their sheikhs. They had been implicated in the May 2003 bombings of five sites in Casablanca that killed 45 people, including 12 suicide bombers. Over 1,000 Salafis were subsequently arrested, and 700 are still in prison. One of the released sheikhs, Mohammed Fizazi, has talked openly of forming a Salafi party as has already happened in Egypt and Tunisia. But Anas Haloui, spokesman for the remaining Salafi detainees, doubted such a move was imminent. He noted there was no agreement among Morocco’s Salafi leaders about recognition of the king’s political or religious authority. Those who followed the Wahhabi traditions of Saudi Arabia, where the king is viewed as prime protector of the religious establishment, accepted Mohammed VI as “Commander of the Faithful.” Others did not, and some rejected the king in any role. Several Moroccan analysts said the Salafis were badly fragmented into as many as six groupings. “Maybe they will form a non-governmental organization first,” said Sanaa Karim, a religious affairs reporter for the PJD newspaper Attajdid. In any case, their numbers were only “some hundreds” and they had no hope of matching the success of Egypt’s Salafis, who won a surprising 28 percent of the vote in last year’s elections. “They have no common leader and no common ground,” she remarked. But this was also true of Egyptian Salafis. David Ottaway is a senior scholar at the Wilson Center who has recently returned from Morocco. This piece is an overview of his observations on Morocco’s Islamists.

  • 11 Marzo 2024
  • 2 minutes
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(Arabnews.com) RABAT: Morocco has become the latest victim of Europe’s debt crisis, as a slump in business with its main export partner and the costs of buying social peace amid Arab world uprisings are forcing the country to impose austerity measures in order to receive international financial assistance. Long a model of relative prosperity in northern Africa, Morocco had to seek help from the International Monetary Fund this month, winning a $ 6.2 billion precautionary credit line. The IMF says it offered the loan to help Morocco cope with fluctuating energy prices and the effects of Europe’s economic troubles. In exchange, the government promised to reform the pension system and a costly program of state subsidies for energy and staples, according to a letter published on the IMF website this week. Morocco’s state spending is at record highs, the deficit is soaring and its No. 1 trading partner — Europe — is flailing. The latest economic figures show that Europe is edging closer to recession, dragged down by the crippling debt problems of the 17 countries that use the euro. Europe’s stumbling economy is making it harder for other economies around the world to recover and policymakers are trying to reach agreement on more decisive action to deal with the debt crisis. Morocco’s tourism income is down 6.9 percent so far this year compared to last. Remittances from Moroccans abroad are down 2.5 percent, according to government figures. A drought and bad harvest this year, along with high oil prices, hurt this country that depends largely on imported energy. State reserves are only enough to buy 4 months’ worth of imports — down from 11 months’ worth in 2005, according to the central bank. Morocco’s government promises to “rationalize spending” and “optimize revenues,” the letter says. It includes measures such as linking public sector salaries to performance, targeting subsidies more efficiently and improving tax collection. Budget Minister Idriss Al Azami Al Idrissi tried to play down worries of major structural cuts. The credit line “is a protection against unpredictable shocks from the international situation, and obtaining it proves the solidity of the national economy,” he said in an interview with the Associated Press. The government pledges to bring deficit to 3 percent of GDP by 2016, compared to an expected 7 percent this year. That will be a challenge. Imposing spending cuts on a populace that saw nationwide protests last year poses social risks. After an uprising in Tunisia set off protests across the Arab world last year, Moroccans too took to the streets and demanded democratic reforms. King Mohamed VI called early elections and made changes to the constitution — and the government spent billions to raise public sector salaries and on subsidies for staples. Then the eurozone debt crisis made things worse. Economist Najib Akesbi says the IMF credit line is prompting long-needed structural reforms. Morocco’s revenues have been covering barely 60 percent of spending, he says. “The trade deficit and the drop in transfers by Moroccans abroad and in tourism oblige Morocco to borrow on international markets,” he said, when in the past the country could rely on domestic sources to raise money. He criticized recent policies of lowering taxes on business, seen as a sop to powerful special interests. “It’s a masochistic policy. Difficult times await Moroccans.” After winning the IMF loan, Morocco announced it will seek $1 billion in a bond issue in September. The finance minister told The AP that the country is tapping dollar bond markets for the first time because Europe’s markets look too risky. “We chose the dollar because we feel that there is a depth on these markets, and the interest rates are more attractive, at a moment when euro markets are preoccupied with the sovereign debt of eurozone countries,” Finance Minister Nizar Baraka said. “Thanks to the IMF precautionary credit line, Morocco is well placed to obtain financing in good conditions,” he added.

  • 11 Marzo 2024
  • 2 minutes

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